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GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE MULTILATERALISM CRISIS IN THE 2010s: THE MAIN CHALLENGES AND RISKS

The main challenges and risks for the foreign policy strategy of Germany, based on the principle of multilateralism, are considered in the conditions of growing mutual distrust and intensification of contradictions in world politics and economics in the 2010s. The growth of Euroscepticism and the migration crisis in the EU, as well as the actions of the United States, Russia, Turkey, China, which, according to Germany, were one-sided and did not take into account the interests of other states, were identified among the most significant problems for the foreign policy of Germany. The measures taken by the government of Angela Merkel to improve the effectiveness of the activities of the German Foreign Ministry and the Federal Intelligence Service, as well as the modernization of the Bundeswehr are identified.

Introduction

The destabilization of the neighboring with the EU regions of Eastern Europe, Middle East and North Africa in the first half of the 2010s was not only one of the most significant threats to the implementation of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. It was also a very serious challenge for the further adherence of Germany as an indisputable flagship of the European integration to the principle of multilateralism in its foreign policy strategy, in conditions when such world and regional leaders as the USA, China, Russia, and the UK are increasingly gravitating toward unilateralism. Last time they preferred to make some crucial decisions based only on their own political or economic interests, regardless of the positions of their traditional allies and partners. The crisis of multilateralism affected also Germany's internal policy, which faced a huge wave of migrants in 2015–2016, but did not receive the expected support from many of its allies in the EU, which focused on protecting their own interests.

In turn the influx of migrants to Germany caused some tectonic changes in the party spectrum and started a rapid intensification of xenophobic and isolationist moods. As a result, in the Bundestag elections on September 24, 2017 thanks to anti-immigrant and anti-European slogans the populist «Alternative for Germany» gained 12, 6 % of votes and ranked third after the CDU/CSU and SPD. Moreover, this case was unprecedented for the entire history of the Federal Republic. Post-war Germany has never faced such influential extreme right-wing political force, which popularity continued to grow slowly in 2018 as well.

All these phenomena and processes led to a discussion in German society about the ability of the government of Angela Merkel to continue its foreign policy based on the principle of multilateralism, which is necessary to secure both the transatlantic partnership and further development of the European integration. Unlike the United States, Britain and even France, there was and there is a full consensus in the German political elite regarding the need to work closely with partners within the EU and NATO. This unity excluded traditionally international problems from a list of the most acute topics of the political competition between the leading German political parties. The close cooperation with the United States and the NATO membership allowed exactly the federal government to minimize military expenditures and other costs in the defense and security sectors for many decades. While the permanently expanding European Union guaranteed a securing and continued expansion of the Ger-

man exports of goods, services and investments within the largest in the world market with more than 500 million consumers.

The strict and successive adherence to the principle of multilateralism as a conceptual and value basis for the foreign policy was of particular importance to Chancellor Angela Merkel as a long-standing leader of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). This party could unite Germany in 1990 on the most favorable terms with the support of the United States and the European NATO allies. Being at the head of the federal governments in 1990–1998 and since 2005 the leaders of the Christian Democrats positioned themselves as ideological architects and watchdogs of the Germany's foreign policy strategy. It allowed the Office of the Federal Chancellor – Das Bundeskanzleramt to play a more significant role in its formation and implementation than the German MFA – Das Auswärtige Amt led by the leaders of the CDU coalition partners, Social Democrats Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Sigmar Gabriel, Heiko Maas or Free Democrats Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Klaus Kinkel, Guido Westerwelle. It is characteristic, that even during the brief stay in power of the coalition of the SPD and the Greens in 1998–2005 the key role of the Chancellor's Office in the foreign policy was fully secured despite a personal significant political influence of the Greens Leader and Minister of Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer.

The international phenomena and processes, which became the challenges for the foreign policy strategies not only in Germany, but also in other European countries, including the Republic of Belarus, in the 2010s, have served as an object of the detailed consideration by political analysts from Germany and many other countries. Among the Belarusian authors, who identified their prerequisites and determined their impact on German policy towards the European neighbors and partners as well as on the entire complex of international relations in Central and Eastern Europe, it should be named A.V. Rusakovich, V.G. Shadurski, A.V. Sharapo, A.V. Tsikhamirau [1–4].

It is necessary also to note that the representatives of the Belarusian school of International Relations Studies adhered mostly to a typical for the European academic and research tradition multi-lateral paradigm of a vision of the foreign policy goals and tasks of the Republic of Belarus and other European states. Increasingly interconnected and interdependent interests and intentions of different actors of international relations in the modern world predetermined such views. This circumstance brings together in fact theoretical and methodological approaches to the study of this topical issue by Belarusian and German authors.

The main challenges and risks for the German foreign policy in the 2010s

The further research of the changes in the foreign policy of Germany and a disclosure of new forms and tools to its implementation in the context of large-scale geo-political and geo-economic transformations in the world during the current decade could provide an objective and comprehensive forecast of the German foreign policy strategy in the future. It has to regard mandatory such challenges and risks to stability and security in Europe and globally as:

1. The crisis phenomena intensified in the 2010s within the process of European integration led to a growth of Euroscepticism as a reaction to the inability to solve quickly and effectively many acute issues. Among them, it should be named an economic inequality between the EU-members, a rising illegal migration, aggravated once again «historically conditioned» contradictions and mutual claims between some states in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe (Poland, Hungary, the Balkan states etc.). The result was not only the Brexit, which reasons were formed during all four decades of the UK participation in the process of European integration, but also a sharp increase of the populist moods in almost all European countries, including Germany. Despite a noticeable decrease of the influx of illegal migrants in 2017–2018, this issue remains highly topical, as they are exploring constantly new and new routes for penetration into the EU, and it continues to complicate social and political situa-

tion in European countries and in the entire Union. Therefore, a memorable and clear evaluation of the situation by Chancellor Angela Merkel speaking in the Bundestag on June 28, 2018 and persuading the representatives to support the financing of a number of urgent measures to solve it was very relevant. She stressed objectively migration could become a crucial issue for the EU. Either in Africa and other regions of the world they will believe that Germany and Europe are guided by values and rely on the principle of multilateralism, not unilateralism, or no one will believe in their value system that has made them so strong [5].

2. The shift of the significant part of the US political elite to the position of unilateralism in world politics and economics, which manifested itself most clearly after the election of Donald Trump as a president and securing of the Republican majority in Congress in November 2016 challenged the perennial foundations of German-US strategic partnership. A realization of the views of the most conservative part of the Republicans led to a tightening of the US demands to its allies in Europe, including Germany as a key ally, in the spring of 2018. The new US administration required to eliminate all tariff barriers in transatlantic trade and to increase a share of military expenditures in the national budgets of all NATO members to 2 % of the GDP according to the organization's requirements. These problems were relevant for relations within the triangle of the United States, Canada and the European allies for many decades, starting from the Cold War era, but only the current establishment of the Republicans, led ideologically by President Donald Trump, chose a path to sharp deterioration in the transatlantic relations to promote the American interests. Some significant problems for the German diplomacy were also created by the US refusal to comply with the terms of the «nuclear deal» with Iran. Its achievement was mentioned in many government documents of the Chancellor Angela Merkel's period as one of the most successful examples of cooperation between the US, the European allies and their most important international partners, and namely Russia and China, for the settlement of this acute and complicated issue of the global security [6, p. 119–120; 7, p. 81]. A criticism of this decision of President Donald Trump, which questioned more than ten-year efforts of the diplomacy of Germany and its European partners to ensure security in the Middle East, was clearly declared in the speech of Chancellor Angela Merkel in the Bundestag on May 16, 2018 [8, p. 3]. It was a clear evidence of the divergence between the US and German positions concerning one of the most important problems of international policy related to the preservation of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.

3. The policy of Russia to strengthen geo-political and geo-economic positions not only within the territory of the former USSR, but also in other important regions of the world, and namely Southeast Europe, Middle East, North Africa, etc. continued despite the sanctions imposed by the European Union with the active support of the government of Angela Merkel. It led to different assessments by representatives of the German political elite concerning the effectiveness of such sanctions, especially when the additional supplies of Russian gas to Germany via the «Nord Stream 2» gas pipeline were evaluated as profitable increasingly in connection with the price policy of the Russian gas monopoly «Gazprom PJSC». The new gas pipeline should begin operating by the end of 2019 despite protests of some German allies in Baltic and Eastern Europe losing their revenues from the transit as well as pressure from the United States [9, p. 6]. The support for the «Nord Stream 2» was another controversial aspect of the current German – US relations regarding the obvious interest of Donald Trump's administration in supplying its own liquefied natural gas to the European ports. This conflict complicated more the transatlantic contradictions and increased the mistrust within the triangle Germany – the United States – Russia. At the same time, Germany together with France is exactly the guarantors of the implementation of the Minsk Agreements, which are directed to ensure a peaceful settlement in the east of Ukraine. The necessity for their unconditional

implementation was emphasized in every program statement by the fourth government of Angela Merkel since March 2018.

4. As in the case of Russia, the policy of pressure, various restrictions and sanctions could be evaluated as inconclusive for Turkey, whose foreign policy has undergone a significant evolution towards the strengthening of the status of an influential regional leader in the Middle East and the Black Sea region during the Presidency of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. This shift reduced, although not completely ruled out the German possibilities to influence the Turkish policy. The continuing acute political struggle within Turkey is also reflected within Germany, where about 3 million people of Turkish origin live. They assess very differently the policy of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and take it definitely into account when they vote for different German political parties as the citizens of the Federal Republic. In addition, Angela Merkel's government, which faced the waves of illegal migrants, was also extremely interested in strict implementation of the agreement with Turkey. It provided for extensive European financial assistance in exchange for the deployment of refugees from Syria, as well as illegal immigrants expelled from the EU on the Turkish territory and entered into force March 20, 2016. Totally in Turkey in early 2018 there were already about 3 million Syrian refugees according to the German estimates [10, p. 3].

5. Unlike Russia and Turkey China did not represent a political challenge for Germany, but its active trade and investment penetration into the regional markets adjacent to the EU could not but worry the federal government. Due to the market structure of the Germany's economy, its authority could not provide the national exporters with the same powerful and constant support, as China does, especially in the case of state-owned corporations. A serious issue was an industrial espionage and copyright infringement, which were also relevant to the Germany's allies, but never brought the German-Chinese relations closer to a direct «trade war» which became a reality between the United States and China in June 2018.

The relevant foreign policy priorities of Germany in key government documents

These challenges and problems were reflected in the text of the first program document, which outlined the overall goals and objectives of the new federal government, and namely the CDU/CSU and SPD Coalition Agreement «A New Way for Europe. A New Dynamic for Germany. A New Unity for Our Country» («Ein neuer Aufbruch für Europa. Eine neue Dynamik für Deutschland. Ein neuer Zusammenhalt für unser Land»). It was presented in Berlin on February 7, 2018 and signed officially on March 12, 2018. The main message of this document was a need to strengthen the role of Europe in the International Relations and to assume more political responsibility facing the increasing global risks and threats [11, p. 6, 144]. At the same time, the content of the Coalition Agreement was mostly a result of the inter-party compromise between the two largest political forces in Germany, and namely the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats. Therefore, this document reflected only the most common vision and general assessment by the representatives of the German political elite of their country's role in European and World politics in next years.

The most important and concrete short-and medium-term approaches of the fourth government of Angela Merkel to the solution of topical foreign policy problems and interaction with key international partners were presented in the first Government Statement of the Federal Chancellor (die Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzlerin) for the Members of the Bundestag on March 21, 2018. Such statement is made traditionally in the first days of the new government work reflected a more detailed vision of the settlement of those problems which are the most topical and acute in the internal and foreign policies of Germany. It continues and develops the main points of the Coalition Agreement and correlates with the current changes in the relations between the Federal Republic and its leading foreign partners as well as with the dynamics of the most significant international phenomena and processes.

Recognizing at the beginning of her speech that Germany and its allies in the EU and NATO could not respond in a timely manner to the growing refugee wave and take the necessary measures, Chancellor Angela Merkel stated the following important steps to resolve this problem. Firstly, despite the skeptical attitude of many German politicians towards the agreement between the EU and Turkey about the deployment of refugees and illegal migrants on the Turkish territory, it must continue to be implemented by providing Turkey with a second planned tranche of 3 billion euros. It will prevent new deaths in the Aegean Sea and the criminal activities of the organizers of illegal migration to the European countries. Germany expected to conclude a similar agreement with the Libyan Government of National Unity. Among other measures the cessation of violent actions from some participants in the Syrian conflict, and namely the government of Bashar Assad, Russia and Turkey, the solution to the problem of underfunding of the UN assistance programs, and the promotion at the EU level of a plan for helping Africa comparable to the Marshall Plan, were named. The preservation of the free movement regime within the EU was linked with an ability of the Union to ensure the security of its external borders. To do this, it was necessary to create a Pan-European Border Agency and a unified register of persons entering and leaving the EU, which would reduce the terrorist threat to Germany. The federal government was still prepared to grant asylum to those who really needed it, and to make every effort to integrate them into the society [10, p. 2–7].

The Chancellor refrained from the direct accusing the current US administration in protectionism, confining herself to a statement in support of the principle of free trade. Angela Merkel focused her attention on the importance of further realization of the European integration idea towards unity and joint economic development which will overcome the current situation, when, despite the resumption of economic growth in the Euro area, many locomotives of the world digital economy are developing not in Europe but in the United States or Asia now. The Chancellor reminded that it is predicting already today, that in the future none of the European countries will have a population exceeding the share in 1 % of the world's number. It predetermines a need to strengthen the European unity and abandon the national egoism. Describing the future relations with Great Britain Angela Merkel stressed, that Germany stands for the best possible close and friendly relations with this country after the finishing of the Brexit, but they can no longer be as close as today, because of the UK striving to leave the EU internal market and the customs union [10, p. 18–20].

Responding again to criticism from Donald Trump, but not naming him directly, the Chancellor noted that Germany is a reliable partner of the NATO and is ready to follow its goals, including financial costs, but at the same time the defense spending will increase in a one-to-one ratio with the costs to help countries in need. Angela Merkel agreed with the necessity to modernize and develop the Bundeswehr, reminding the increase of the defense spending since 2014, but also called for a positive assessment of the fact, that there was none of the NATO or EU members believed that Germany was spending for its defense too much. According to the Chancellor, it testifies to the absence of fears in the world concerning the German possible militarization [10, p. 21].

The Head of the German government declared solidarity with Britain in the case of the use of a prohibited chemical substance on its territory in March 2018, in which Russia was accused. Angela Merkel stressed also that it is necessary to continue work on Minsk Agreements implementation, which will ensure the sovereignty of Ukraine and rebuild relations with Russia on a new basis. Among other conflicts, which require the urgent political settlement and stabilization, the situation in Iraq, Syria, and Libya was called. Germany together with Great Britain and France expressed a readiness to continue the work on preserving the nuclear agreement with Iran in spite of the tough position of the Donald Trump's administration. Angela Merkel focused particularly on the future relations with Turkey, which de-

spite a close cooperation with this country in the areas of economy, fighting terrorism, regulation of migration, were and still are difficult, primarily because of the situation in Turkey with the human rights [10, p. 21–22].

However, in the first statement of the new German government, there was not any mention about the future policy towards China, although the Coalition Agreement referred not only to the prospects of cooperation with China, whose economic growth could provide new opportunities for the German companies. The CDU/CSU and the SPD declared also in the agreement, that the free access of Chinese products to the markets of Germany and the entire EU should be accompanied by the same measures from China based on the principle of reciprocity. Some questions were also formulated concerning the project to create a continental Eurasian transport system, which was characterized in the agreement text as the «Chinese initiative of the Silk Road». The answer to it should be a unified European approach focused on protecting the EU interests with the assistance of an optimal combination of German and European financial instruments. The new government of Angela Merkel and the EU leadership had to define clearly these interests and identify the concrete measures to ensure them [11, p. 153]. Speaking for the Members of the Bundestag on February 22, 2018, Angela Merkel acknowledged again that the EU needs a more effective consolidated foreign policy towards Russia, China and resolution of different regional conflicts [12]. Based on this, it could be assumed that the absence of the topic about the German-Chinese relations in the first Government Statement of the new Angela Merkel's coalition indicated its unwillingness to declare and take any unilateral actions concerning China. The German aim was to shape a common EU vision on a further strategy of interaction with this growing pole of world politics. Such approach allowed a reliable involving in its long-term realization of those small and medium-sized European countries in Eastern Europe, the Baltic and the Balkans, which expressed their special interest in cooperation with China, counting on Chinese investments, financial and technical aid.

The foreign policy, defense and intelligence structures of Germany in adaptation to the new challenges

The adaptation of the German policy to new global challenges and risks required also to review and update the structures and directions of the activities of the foreign policy service, the Bundeswehr and the intelligence community. These changes testified to the final deliverance of Germany from the informal status of the «economic giant, but political and military dwarf», which corresponded in no way to its current leading and stabilizing role in the European and world politics.

For the German MFA, an important event was the appointment of new Minister Heiko Maas, who had not been involved previously in international activities and therefore could pursue a more flexible foreign policy without relying on previous informal arrangements or commitments. Until 2013, his political career was built in the state (Das Land) Saar in the far west of Germany, where he led the local Social Democrats and was a Member of the State's government. After the return of the SPD to the federal ruling coalition in 2013, Heiko Maas became Minister of Justice in the third government of Angela Merkel [13]. In March 2018, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, he replaced the long-standing leaders of the SPD Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Sigmar Gabriel, who determined not only the foreign policy agenda of their party, but formed the German internal and international strategy together with the Chancellor in the early 21st century.

The modernization affected the entire diplomatic service, which began to use methods and forms of the modern «digital diplomacy» more intensively. It included the use of various information and communication technologies, as well as the activity in social media and regular interaction with users. One of the examples is the updated website of the Embassy of the

Federal Republic in Minsk, which has some direct links to the social media materials, including the profiles of the Auswärtiges Amt and the Embassy itself in the Facebook, and the information about the relevant educational and cultural German-Belarusian projects [14]. Such approach was correlated clearly with the increase in financing by the new government of Angela Merkel of the media concern «Deutsche Welle» focused on foreign audiences and providing the topical news and comments in 30 languages. All these measures were directed to increase the effectiveness of the Germany's «soft power» abroad in the frameworks of the growing transparency and interdependence of the information areas of different countries and regions, which continues to increase thanks to the use of the most advanced information and communication technologies and approaches.

The changes that are even more significant were required in the defense sphere, taking into account the increased responsibility of Germany for the security of its allies and partners, and especially against the background of the open criticism for the low share of defense expenditures in the German national budget from the administration of Donald Trump. In a Government Statement on February 22, 2018, timed to an informal meeting of the EU heads of state and government in Brussels, Angela Merkel reminded that Germany is the second largest NATO member after the United States in terms of the number of the troops given for the alliance, including its foreign missions. Nevertheless, she acknowledged some shortcomings of the Bundeswehr and recalled that her government had committed itself to increasing the defense spending to the recommended by the NATO (2 %), and this decision is not being questioned in Germany unlike other the members of this alliance [12].

In a Government Speech on May 16, 2018, devoted to the budget execution this year, the Chancellor detailed the necessity to strengthen the financing of the Bundeswehr, despite the high costs of its modernization. Angela Merkel noted that in the «White Paper 2006 on the German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr» («Weißbuch 2006 zur Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr»), which was approved by her first government, the focus was on foreign missions [15].

In this connection the Chancellor quoted the words of Minister of Defense Peter Struck (2002–2005) that «The Germany's security is also on the Hindu Kush» (a mountain range from central to northern Afghanistan) [8, p. 5]. The events after 2014, including the conflict in Syria, increased the importance of the defense of the territory of Germany and its allies. It was recorded both in the decisions of the NATO in 2014 and in the new edition of the «White Paper 2016 on the German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr» («Weißbuch 2016 zur Sicherheitspolitik und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr») [7]. According to the Chancellor, the Bundeswehr should be retrofitted to meet the pressing additional tasks. Namely a control over the airspace of the Baltic countries, security guarantees for Poland and three Baltic states (for Lithuania Germany acts as a main guarantor), a strengthening of the multinational corps in Szczecin, a fulfillment of obligations to Romania and Bulgaria [8, p. 5–6].

Based on this, Angela Merkel defined the priority task of increasing mobility and re-equipping of the Bundeswehr, including improving the quality of the military training. The next task was the creation of a cyber-commando in the Bundeswehr to repel threats in the digital environment, while Angela Merkel referred to the new military doctrine of Russia adopted in 2014, part of which was to conduct «hybrid» operations. She recognized the Russian successes in this sphere, which should be answered and confronted effectively by the German armed forces. The Chancellor called for strengthening of the EU defense component. As «good news», she described the starting of a ten-year plan for the creation of the European Defense Union, which is directed to structure the cooperation between its members in this area. Germany will be also responsible for some projects. Angela Merkel said that the EU produces 178 weapons systems, while the US only 30, that predetermines the need for closer coordination in this area, including training of military personnel. At the same time, the Chan-

cellor reminded that the United States spends about 3,5 % of its gross domestic product on defense, but this share is less than 2 % within the EU [8, p. 6–7].

To solve the acute migration problem, she called for support of the activity and widening of the functions of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), which should include more than 1,400 police officers since such their current number cannot effectively protect the EU external borders. This agency needed also the modern equipment, and Germany was ready to make every effort to realize this task [8, p. 7].

Angela Merkel returned to the defense issue in a Government Statement on June 28, 2018, which was presented on the eve of the coming NATO summit in Brussels on July 11–12, 2018. The Chancellor called once again for strengthening of the alliance on the backdrop of growing threats to security, and namely for increasing its defensive capabilities and mobility, security guarantees for allies in Central and Eastern Europe, while maintaining the readiness to conduct a dialogue with Russia, the fulfillment by all NATO members of their obligations to finance the defense spending. She reminded the decision to create two new alliance headquarters, including one in Ulm (Bavaria), which should be assessed as an important German contribution to the NATO reinforcement. The federal government has also committed to increase the defense spending to 1,5 % of gross domestic product until 2024 [5]. However, such tempo of realizations by Germany and other NATO members of their financial obligations did not suit the US administration that led to an open conflict between President Donald Trump and the European leaders at the Brussels NATO Summit in July 2018.

Moreover, the modernization of the Bundeswehr encountered some difficulties with its staffing. The withdrawal of the compulsory conscription from July 1, 2011 led to a shortage of military personnel, as the prestige of military service in modern Germany is extremely low. The public opinion is very skeptical about raising of the defense spending to 2 %, which is planned to be achieved until 2030. This decision is approved by only about 15 % of the population [16]. To solve this problem in 2018 it was proposed to invite the citizens of other EU states to serve in the Bundeswehr. Both ruling parties supported this idea, but the SPD insisted on granting to such soldiers the German citizenship to avoid a creation of the army of mercenaries [17].

The structures and tasks of the German intelligence community have also undergone a transformation, which reflected some new challenges comparable to the Cold War period. As the German weekly magazine «Der Spiegel» claimed in March 2018, the Federal Intelligence Service – Der Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) reconstituted a counter-intelligence unit, which strength should exceed 50 officers. The reasons for this decision were the need to monitor the situation in and around Russia, China, Iran and North Korea, the growing intensity of the Russian and Chinese special services working within the German territory, as well as counteracting their activities abroad or at least collecting additional information about their goals and methods [18].

Conclusion

Finally, it must be emphasized that all these measures are directed undoubtedly to intensifying and enhancement of the most important aspects of the German foreign and defense policy. During the last two years the Federal Republic has not only strengthened its indisputable role as the leader of the united Europe, but has become one of the key guarantors for the preservation of the current international order, based on the principles of multilateralism, free trade, and close interaction within different international and regional organizations. The more active participation of Germany in maintaining of global security and stability, which could be evaluated as inevitable due to the increasing challenges and risks, opens up the new prospects and opportunities for further cooperation with the Republic of Belarus. Our both coun-

tries situated in the heartland of Europe are interested particularly in the peaceful and sustainable development and cooperation.

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Фрольцов В.В. Внешняя политика Германии в условиях кризиса мультилатерализма в 2010-е гг.: основные вызовы и риски

Рассмотрены основные вызовы и риски для внешнеполитической стратегии Германии, основанной на принципе мультилатерализма, в условиях нарастания взаимного недоверия и усиления противоречий в мировой политике и экономике в 2010-е гг. Среди наиболее значимых проблем для внешней политики ФРГ определены рост евроскептицизма и миграционный кризис в ЕС, а также действия США, России, Турции, Китая, которые, по оценке Германии, носили односторонний характер и не учитывали интересов других государств. Выявлены меры, предпринятые правительством Ангелы Меркель для повышения эффективности деятельности МИД ФРГ и Федеральной разведывательной службы, а также модернизации бундесвера.